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Abstract
When credit application experiences are examined, minority-owned small firms are not the
discouraged borrowers that credit outcome studies generally suggest. This paper examines
repeated application for credit by small firms. Univariate statistical analysis reveals that
persistence is necessary but insufficient for minority firms to be successful credit applicants. At
the same time, minority-owned firms overall were more likely than white-owned firms to make
repeated attempts to obtain credit, though successful minority applicants actually required fewer
applications than their white cohorts. Multivariate regression also finds that different firm,
lender, banking relationship, and loan characteristics affect the continued search for credit by
minority- and white-owned small firms.
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Minority Small-Firm Credit Applicants: Does Persistence Pay?
I. Introduction
Do minority-owned small firms become discouraged after denial of credit from a
financial institution? This study explores the credit search behavior of minority-owned firms in
comparison to other firms. Minority-owned firms have become increasingly important to welldeveloped economies as well as emerging markets (Carney, 2007). Minority-owned firms
comprised only 7 percent of all firms in the United States in 1982 but more than 15 percent of
the 20.8 million firms by 1997 and 18 percent of the 23 million firms by 2002. Although
government programs may be partially responsible, much of the growth accompanied the rise in
the U.S. minority population, which was 30.9% of the total U.S. population in 1997. The trend
indicates continued faster growth in the numbers of minority-owned small firms (Didia, 2008;
Fairlie, 2004), particularly Hispanic-owned and Asian-owned ones.
Nearly a quarter of all U.S. firms had paid employees, while slightly more than 20
percent of minority-owned firms generated more than 4.7 million payroll jobs, many of them
filled by minorities (U.S. Small Business Administration, 2007). The majority of these employer
firms are small businesses, with a total employee size of less than 500, 21 employees on average
for nonminority-owned firms and less than 10 for minority-owned firms in 2002. They
contributed nearly $600 billion in revenues to the economy and offered a self-employment
avenue for minority owners.1
However, an impediment to minority business ownership and performance relative to
white-owned businesses (Fairlie and Robb, 2007) is still the lack of financing, particularly
formal external finance (Eknanem, 1992). Only two-thirds of minority small firms used credit
overall, with nearly 25 percent of minority small firms using bank credit (U.S. Small Business
Administration, 2007). Although the incidence of bank credit has been diminishing, with trade
credit as a substitute (Hussain and Matlay, 2007), bank credit remains the primary source of
formal external finance to small firms and of overall credit in terms of volume of credit (Berger
and Udell, 1998; Federal Reserve Board, 2002).
Studies suggest that discouraged minority-owned small firms do not even apply for
formal credit because of expected denial (Kon and Storey, 2003; Coleman, 2004; Cavalluzzo et
al., 2002). Such discouraged behavior may be rational self-selection (Han, Stuart, and Storey,
2009). Recent studies also confirm that such firms face greater difficulties in obtaining credit
than do white-owned ones (e.g., Lussier, Greenberg, and Corman, 1998; Cavalluzzo and
Cavalluzzo, 1998; Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo, and Wolken, 2002; Smallbone et al., 2003). The
outcome-based measures used only indicate that minorities do not even apply or are rejected in
greater proportion when they do apply. There is no measure of how they react to a credit
application denial, i.e., whether they continue to seek credit or not.
This study addresses whether minority-owned firms are persistent in their efforts to
obtain credit and how their efforts compare to those of their white counterparts. Persistence here
is measured by the number of financial institutions applied to for credit before success in
1

All figures are from the Minorities in Business: A Demographic Review of Minority Business Ownership 2007
report by the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA), comparable to those in the SBA’s Minorities in Business
2001 report. Minority-owned firms here are those that are more than 51 percent owned in terms of ownership
concentration by owners who are identified as a racial minority, while white-owned firms are those that are more
than 51 percent owned in terms of ownership concentration by owners who are identified as not a racial minority.
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obtaining credit or quitting the search. Among those who are ultimately successful, more
persistence may indicate greater difficulties to become successful. Greater persistence among
those who are continually unsuccessful may indicate their being less discouraged, not quitting
the search for credit when denied.
The analysis indicates that proportionately more minority-owned firms than white-owned
firms are persistent. To be successful, they cannot afford to be discouraged. Generally,
successful firms are persistent. It also examines factors that may explain differences in credit
application persistence among minority-owned firms and among white-owned firms.
The relevant literature is discussed in the following section. Section III describes the data
set. Then Section IV describes the credit outcomes and credit application persistence. Section V
presents the empirical estimation model with discussion of the variables, followed by the results
in Section VI and concluding remarks in Section VII.
II.

Relevant Literature

To date numerous studies have considered minority-owned small firms as discouraged
borrowers that fear denial of credit and thus do not even apply (Coleman, 2002; Fraser, 2009).
Other reasons for not applying include disinterest (Bond and Townsend, 1996) or sufficient
alternative financing sources, including retained earnings or trade credit (Coleman, 2004). Other
literature finds that minority firms that do apply for credit are more likely to experience denial of
credit (Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo, 1998; Squires and O’Connor, 2001; Cohn and Coleman,
2001; Park and Coleman, 2009), to receive smaller amounts of credit (Bates, 1996; Lussier et al.,
1998), and to face worse terms and conditions of credit (Blanchflower et al., 2003)2.
Very few papers examine the continued search for credit due to the paucity of related
panel data. In a qualitative study Buttner and Rosen (1992) consider the perceptions of male and
female entrepreneurs in terms of strategies after denial of bank credit and find that they are rather
similar in wanting to seek funding from another bank. Hanley and Crook (2005) find that the
cost of repeat finance is higher than that for the first round of credit received by entrepreneurs in
general. No study known by the author considers the minority-owned firms’ actual behavior
after denial. This paper considers the repeated credit applications by minority firms to determine
whether such persistence results in success. Their experience is compared to white-owned small
firms to determine if minority firms have to be more persistent in a search for credit.
III.

Data

The data come from the 1995 National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB)
survey of its member firms’ financing experiences. 3 The available data set of 3,642 small firms
offers firm-level observations of a random sample of its more than 600,000 members nationwide.
The survey is unique particularly with regard to different aspects of relationships between
borrowing firms and their financial institutions.
2

Smallbone et al. (2003), however, find some convergence in these credit experiences between ethnic minority
businesses and white-owned businesses in the United Kingdom and more variation among the ethnic minority
businesses instead.
3
The Federal Reserve's Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF) data set is comparable in size to the NFIB, but
along with other differences in survey coverage, the SSBF does not offer count data that is material to measuring
persistence in terms of number of institutions applied to.
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Firms of unidentifiable employee size, over 500 employees, or unspecified firm owner’s
race were excluded from the sample. Those with unknown credit application outcomes also
were not included. Minority-owned businesses here refer to those small firms that are primarily
owned by a racial minority owner/s in terms of ownership concentration, specifically 51 percent
ownership. Alternative measures have recently been suggested to determine what constitutes a
minority entrepreneur, including links to the ethnic community (Chaganti and Greene, 2002) and
smaller ownership concentrations (Sonfield, 2005), though these are not official government
measures or widespread in the research literature. The survey data set offers answers about the
persistence of applicants seeking credit from financial institutions. Those with unknown credit
application outcomes were not included either. The final working sample includes 3,113 firms,
with 2,918 owned by whites, and 195 firms owned by minorities.
Full observations are not available for all minority-owned firms to warrant separate
empirical analysis between different minority or gender subgroups. Also the data preclude a
panel data set construct of serial credit experiences over time. However, these limitations do not
affect the findings.
IV.

Credit Outcomes and Application Persistence

The credit outcomes for firms in this study mirror those comparative results in previous
studies. Discouraged borrowers are those not inclined to apply for credit from a financial
institution due to fear of denial. Nearly nine percent of minority-owned firms did not apply for
such credit. Since reasons are not specified, it cannot be determined how many were discouraged
borrowers. However, the same proportion of white-owned firms also did not apply. Such firms
generally sought credit from friends, relatives, other individuals, or other unspecified sources.
While more than 10 percent of the sample white-owned firms that did apply are unable to
obtain credit, 20.5% of minority-owned firms are unsuccessful in their most recent credit search.
Their self-reported difficulties are more striking, as 38.8% of minority-owned firms were unable
to satisfy credit needs consistently, compared to only 24.7% of white-owned firms. These
outcomes indicate that minority-owned firms face greater credit constraints.
The repeated credit application outcomes also somewhat confirm the findings about
credit difficulties for minority-owned firms. Table 1 presents a statistical summary of credit
application persistence by the small firms, which shows differences between ultimately
successful and unsuccessful applicants. Among the successful credit applicants, 29.3% of
minority-owned firms tried more than one institution before becoming successful, whereas only
19.9% of such white-owned firms had to exert such credit search efforts. Similarly, a higher
percentage of successful minority-owned borrowers than white-owned borrowers had to go to
more than two institutions. These group differences are significant and suggest that
proportionately more minority borrowers had to be persistent in their credit search than their
white counterparts, despite rather similar compositions of being incorporated and being of large
asset size. Summary statistics from Table II indicate that minority firms were younger and were
more likely to be female-owned.
However, the average number of tries by these successful minority-owned firms was
consistently smaller than that of the successful white-owned firms (see Table I). This was true
even when truncated means were considered to account for the outliers. This indicates that
where ultimately successful small-firm borrowers faced difficulties, white-owned firms had to be
more persistent in their credit applications than did minority-owned firms. This could be
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explained in part by Table II summary statistics that indicate that white firms demanded larger
loans, from smaller lenders, and did not enjoy increased competition among lenders.
The picture of persistence for unsuccessful firms is less nuanced. As many as 56.0% of
ultimately unsuccessful white-owned firms tried repeated institutions before quitting (see Table
I). Minority-owned firms were more likely to persist in their credit search, with 62.9% of them
trying more than one institution before quitting. This finding was also true with respect to firms
that applied to more than two institutions and more than three institutions for credit. The average
number of tries by minority-owned firms was also greater than that of white-owned firms across
different degrees of persistence. According to Table II, no significant differences in summary
statistics were found between these minority and white-owned firms to suggest greater
difficulties for minority applicants. Overall, minority borrowers are less easily discouraged than
fear-of-denial studies suggest. Persistence itself does not necessarily lead to a successful
application outcome however.
V.

Empirical Analysis

The logit regression estimation equation is specified for two measures of persistence,
with one measure indicating applicants who tried more than one institution (i =1), meaning two
or more, and the other measure indicating those who tried more than two institutions (i = 2),
specifically three or more, as follows:
Yi= β0i + ΣβijXij + εi, where i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2,..,10.
(1)
Yi is the binary dependent variable corresponding to the respective measure of application
persistence. Xij is the jth control variable, among ten identified from the survey responses of
small firms that represent characteristics of the firm, financial institution, and financing
relationship, with constant β0 and error term ε.
A.
Variables
Table III provides a description of the variables, and Tables IV and V offer descriptive
statistics. With the available data, differences in credit application persistence are assessed after
controlling first for firm characteristics that affect the small firm’s ability to obtain credit. Being
incorporated offers the firm's credit history from public information (Blanchflower et al., 2003).
More years owned indicates greater business experience of the owner and greater probability of
survival that reduces the risk of default to the lender. Winker (1999) thus finds that firm age
reduces the credit rationing probability for firms, as does size. Greater asset value indicates
potentially greater collateralizable value in case of default (Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo, 1998).
Reflecting better borrower creditworthiness, these factors are thus expected to reduce the number
of tries necessary to obtain credit.
Next, among the financial institution characteristics, per-borrower lending limits imposed
by the lender may leave the borrower with unfulfilled needs when a larger loan is requested
(Lussier et al.,1998). Although a larger financial institution in terms of asset size is better able
to accommodate a larger loan request, such a larger institution’s lending focus may not
necessarily be oriented toward small firms.4 Coleman (2002) also considers the financial
institution asset size with regard to small firm credit constraints, though with more of a focus on
the financial institution than on the small firm. Greater competition among lenders reduces a
4

In a theoretical study, Besci et al. (2005) also indicate that the bargaining ability of lenders and borrowers depends
on the average funds available per lender.
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small firm's probability of becoming a lender’s captive (Sharpe, 1990) and increases alternative
sources of credit access that make it easier to shop around. All these factors are likely to require
or encourage borrower credit search persistence.
The third category of characteristics represents the financing relationship. Using a larger
number of banks for financial services weakens the firm’s financing relationship with its primary
financial institution (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). This causes the credit process to become more
purely transaction based and induces borrower persistence. Finally, the owners’ conduct of
personal banking with the firm’s financial institution offers information value, though limited,
about the firm’s creditworthiness and requires less borrower persistence.
Ownership race is used as a dummy explanatory variable, as is ownership gender. To the
extent that minority-owned firms and female-owned firms face greater credit difficulties, such
firms will require a greater number of tries to obtain credit, though they may be discouraged
from doing so.5
B.
Descriptive Statistics
Minority-owned firms were somewhat less likely to be incorporated than white-owned
firms and to be slightly smaller in asset size. Generally the two groups of firms used similar
numbers of banks for their financial services. Otherwise, however, the differences between the
two groups were statistically significant, as reported in Table IV. Minority-owned firms were
younger with higher percentages of female-ownership. A larger percentage of the minority
firms' owners conducted personal banking at the firm's bank. The minority-owned firms also
demanded smaller loans, had larger primary lenders, and enjoyed greater lender competition.
Minority-owned firms thus would not unequivocally need to be more persistent in their credit
search than white-owned firms.
Minority-owned firms were not generally different from white-owned firms in applying
for credit. Although white-owned firms requested larger loans on average, and proportionately
more minority owners conducted personal banking at the firm's bank, these differences were not
significant. Rather increased lender competition for minority-owned firms and a higher
percentage of female owners distinguished the two groups of firms. See Table V for differences
between groups of firms that tried 1 institution or not.
However, minority-owned firms that tried repeated financial institutions were quite
different from white-owned firms that also tried repeated institutions (See Table V). Such
minority-owned firms were more likely than white-owned firms to be unincorporated, younger,
and have smaller asset values. At the same time, because they requested much smaller loans, did
business with larger asset-sized financial institutions, and had owners that conducted personal
banking at the firm's bank, there would be less need for credit search persistence by such
minority-owned firms. Gender was not a distinguishing factor between these more persistent
groups of firms.
VI.

Results

Table VI presents the multivariate regression results. Results for all firms indicate the
pooled regression results. The predictive accuracy of the regression estimation was 77.0 percent.
5

Because no significant difference was found in number of tries between minority females and minority males or
between white females and white males, an interaction term minority owner*female owner was not deemed to be
appropriate here.
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The estimation model’s accuracy measures where the model correctly predicted that numerous
financial institutions would likely be applied to and actually were applied to for credit, or where
it predicted that only one institution would likely be applied to and actually was applied to in the
credit search by the small firm. This suggests that the model is better than chance at determining
the likelihood of credit search persistence.
Race of the owner is significant in affecting credit search persistence, by increasing the
probability of the firm’s trying, applying to more than one financial institution for credit. The
results are similar for firms primarily owned by females. As expected, being incorporated, years
of business ownership, and a firm's large asset size each reduce persistence, while the size of the
loan requested, and the number of bank relationships increase persistence. Although a larger
lender will have greater capacity to meet loan requests and thus reduce a firm’s credit search
efforts, its loan portfolio may be oriented away from small-firm lending and increase a small
firm’s need to make credit applications to numerous institutions. Contrary to conventional
expectation, personal banking by the firm's owners actually increases persistence, though this
result is not significant. Such banking may not be beneficial to obtaining credit if it is
compulsory and not associated with the firm’s actual creditworthiness.
These results are otherwise robust to a greater degree of persistence, where firms tried
more than two institutions, i.e., applied to three or more institutions for credit. Lender
competition and female ownership become significant in increasing credit search persistence.
Race remains a significant factor in positively affecting credit search persistence. Thus, separate
regressions are conducted to understand variation among white-owned firms and among
minority-owned firms.
Table VI also presents the regression estimates for white-owned firms. The predictive
accuracy of the model increases to 90.0 percent. Since this group represents 93% of the total
sample, the test results are similar to all firms. Specifically, most of those significant variables
remain unchanged, including borrower’s asset size, requested loan size, number of relationship
banks, and gender. However, for white-owned firms, years owned and lender asset size no
longer matter, while personal banking emerges as somewhat significant in increasing borrower
persistence. Such banking may not beneficial to obtaining credit if it is compulsory and not
correlated with the firm’s actual creditworthiness. The results for firms which tried more than
two financial institutions for credit are almost identical, in terms of significant variables.
Table VI also presents the regression results for minority-owned firms. The predictive
accuracy of the estimation model remains above 75 percent. Quite different from the results of
white owned firms, the only variables significant are years of ownership and the firm’s large
asset size. They are direct indices of ability to repay credit and thus reduce the need for
borrower persistence as expected. Results for those minority-owned firms that tried more than
two financial institutions are similar. A small firm’s larger asset size remains significant, while
lender competition emerges as significant in increasing the probability of credit search
persistence. The ability to seek alternate lenders increases the likelihood of applying to
numerous institutions.
VII.

Conclusions

In conclusion, differences in credit application persistence between minority- and whiteowned firms are significant. As a group minority-owned firms require more credit search efforts
than white-owned firms. This result further underscores the difficulty of such firms in obtaining
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formal financing. However, when only successful borrowers are considered, minority-owned
firm require less effort than white-owned ones. Although not as statistically significant, even
with continued denial, minority firms are also more persistent than white-owned firms. This
result suggests that minority firms that do apply are not easily discouraged and should not be.
Thus, minority ownership is a significant explanatory factor in the persistence of all the
small firms. According to the multivariate regression results, relatively different significant
factors affect credit application persistence for white-owned and minority-owned firms. Overall,
incorporated, older white-owned firms with larger asset values are less likely to apply to more
than one institution, while those having relationships with more banks are more persistent, as are
those requesting larger loans and those owned by females. Personal banking by the owners does
not appear to benefit these white-owned firms. For minority-owned firms, age is more beneficial
to obtaining credit, as is a larger asset size. Both factors thus reduce these firms' need to persist
in obtaining credit. However, lender competition uniquely only affects the likelihood of
minority-owned firms’ persistence.
The findings indicate that only looking at the nonparticipation of discouraged borrowers
in the credit market and a single credit application outcome will lead to incomplete and
misleading conclusions by policymakers and researchers about minority-owned firms’
experience with external finance from financial institutions. Although these firms are more
likely to be discouraged from participating in the credit market, they are not discouraged from
continuing to participate in the market once they do so. The results also indicate that comparing
minority-owned firms to white-owned firms requires assessment of differences among minorityowned firms themselves. Minority-owned firms that do apply for credit are not the same as
those that do not apply for fear of denial. Furthermore, firms that are persistent in their credit
search are distinguishable from those that only apply once. Future research might consider
additional subsets of the minority-owned firms to compare the 5.8% of firms majority owned by
Hispanics, 4.4% by Asian-Americans, 4.0% by African Americans, and the 0.9% by American
Indians in the United States for example. 6 As panel data sets become available, an additional
extension should consider if credit search persistence is necessary and worthwhile over the small
firm’s lifecycle to reconcile the viability and performance differences between minority-owned
and white-owned small firms.

6

Note of course that these subsets themselves do not list further subdivisions by ethnic grouping.
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Table I
Credit search persistence
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Successful firms
No. of institutions
Between group
applied to
All firms (A)
White firms (W) Minority firms (M) equality tests (WM)
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Tried 1
79.6%
80.1%
70.7%
0.133
More than 1
20.4%
19.9%
29.3%
6.302**
Median no. of tries 2
2
2
0.589
Mean no. of tries
3.3(6.605)
3.3(6.880)
2.8(1.063) 134731.5***
Tried 2
12.2%
12.0%
15.0%
0.801
More than 2
8.2%
7.9%
14.3%
6.025**
Median no. of tries 3
3
3
0.343
Mean no. of tries
5.1(10.139)
5.3(10.657)
3.6(1.017) 139213.0***
Tried 3
4.9%
4.6%
9.0%
4.394**
More than 3
3.4%
3.3%
5.3%
0.987
Median no. of tries 4
4
4
0.627
Mean no. of tries
8.2(15.382)
8.5(16.067)
4.6(1.134) 145785.5
N (those which tried) 2370
2237
133
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Unsuccessful firms
No. of institutions
Between group
applied to
All firms (A)
White firms (W) Minority firms (M) equality tests (WM)
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Tried 1
43.3%
44.0%
37.1%
0.041
More than 1
56.7%
56.0%
62.9%
0.352
Median no. of tries 3
2
3
0.481
Mean no. of tries
2.9(1.316)
2.9(1.277)
3.2(1.571)
4628.500
Tried 2
27.9%
28.2%
25.7%
0.011
More than 2
28.8%
27.8%
37.1%
0.905
Median no. of tries 3
3
3
0.453
Mean no. of tries
3.8(1.344)
3.8(1.313)
4.1(1.553)
4506.500
Tried 3
17.2%
16.9%
20.0%
0.049
More than 3
11.6%
10.9%
17.1%
0.649
Median no. of tries 4
4
5
0.429
Mean no. of tries
5.0(1.453)
4.9(4.936)
5.3(1.506)
4660.500
N (those which tried) 319
284
35
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses.
Chi-squared test conducted for equality between group proportions.
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test conducted for equality between group medians.
Mann-Whitney U test conducted for equality between group means.
Differences were significant at the 1% level***, at the 5% level**, and at the 10% level*.
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Table II
Descriptive Statistics for Successful credit applicant firms and Unsuccessful credit applicant firms
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Explanatory
All successful firms
White firms
Minority firms
Equality
variables
Tests
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Incorporated
64.9%
64.9%
63.4%
0.091
Years owned
Large asset value
Loan size request
Lender asset size
Lender competition
Number of banks
Personal banking
Female owner

1.474**KS

16.2
(13.026)
57.3%

16.3
(13.073)
57.3%

14.4
(12.125)
57.8%

445,283
(4392856.01)
6,956,000,000
(17790000000)
40.0%

462,976
(4518916.93)
6,886,000,000
(18140000000)
39.6%

147,697
(563338.188)
8,021,000,000
(11440000000)
46.7%

173619.500*

1.4
(0.754)
68.2%

1.4
(0.742)
67.8%

1.5
(0.930)
75.5%

195137.000

9.8%

9.2%

20.8%

0.001

1.369**KS
2.740*

3.584*
20.795***

Minority owner
5.6%
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Explanatory
All unsuccessful firms White firms
Minority firms
Equality
variables
Tests
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Incorporated
59.9%
60.2%
57.5%
0.024
Years owned

13.0
(12.616)
38.1%

13.3
(13.002)
39.9%

10.9
(8.921)
25.0%

5601.500

412,493
(5293853.36)
12,340,000,000
(28720000000)
37.9%

454,151
(5623418.63)
11,900,000,000
(28510000000)
37.1%

88,600
(151380.790)
15,810,000,000
(30690000000)
44.4%

5192.000

Personal banking

1.4
(0.740)
64.0%

1.4
(0.765)
63.2%

1.2
(0.474)
70.3%

Female owner

14.8%

14.5%

17.5%

Large asset value
Loan size request
Lender asset size
Lender competition
Number of banks

Minority owner
11.4%
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses.
Chi-squared test conducted for equality between group proportions.
Mann-Whitney U test conducted for equality between group means.
KS
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic where Mann-Whitney U test was not applicable.
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Differences were significant at the 1% level***, at the 5% level**, and at the 10% level.
Table III
Description of variables
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Variables
Coded
Definition
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Dependent Variables
Tried more than one financial institution

Dummy
tried=1, not=0

applied to more than one financial institution
before successful or stopped trying

Dummy
tried=1, not=0

applied to more than two institutions
before successful or stopped trying

Dummy
yes=1, not=1

legal form of business is corporation

Years owned

Scale
years

how long current owner owned this business

Large asset value

Dummy
yes=1, not=0

total asset value of firm at end of last fiscal
year $200,000 or more

Loan size request

Scale
dollars

loan amount requested

Lender asset size

Scale
dollars

how large firm's principal financial
institution is in terms of its assets

Lender competition

Dummy
yes=1, not=0

more competition for firm's business
among financial institutions from before

Number of banks

Scale
whole numbers

how many banks firm uses to obtain
its financial services

Personal banking

Dummy
yes=1, not=0

does the owner/s conduct personal banking
at the firm's principal bank

Female owner

Dummy
yes=1, not=0

principal owner/s of business female

Minority owner

Dummy
yes=1, not=0

principal owner/s of business African
American, Hispanic American, or other
minority

Tried more than two financial institutions

Explanatory Variables
Incorporated

______________________________________________________________________________
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Table IV
Descriptive Statistics
for the sample
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
All firms
White firms
Minority firms
Equality
Explanatory
Tests
variables
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Incorporated

64.3%

64.4%

62.2%

0.577

Years owned

15.8
(13.018)
55.2%

16.0
(13.096)
55.5%

13.7
(11.608)
50.8%

1.449**KS

$441,586
(4502518.89)
$7,610,000,000
(19520000000)
39.8%

462,035
(4648022.99)
7,465,000,000
(19670000000)
39.3%

135,574
242995.000**
(507046.520)
9,605,000,000
1.695***KS
(17290000000)
46.3%
3.273*

Personal banking

1.4
(0.752)
67.7%

1.4
(0.745)
67.3%

1.4
(0.864)
74.5%

Female owner

10.4%

9.7%

20.1%

Minority owner

6.3%

Large asset value
Loan size request
Lender asset size
Lender competition
Number of banks

1.380

275596.000
3.846**
19.873***

N observations
3113
2918
195
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses.
Chi-squared test conducted for equality between group proportions.
Mann-Whitney U test conducted for equality between group means.
KS
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic where Mann-Whitney U test was not applicable.
Differences were significant at the 1% level***, at the 5% level**, and at the 10% level*.
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Table V
Descriptive Statistics for firms that tried (applied to) 1 financial institution and tried (applied to) more than 1
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Explanatory
All firms tried 1
White firms
Minority firms
Equality
Variables
Tests
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Incorporated
65.5%
65.2%
72.0%
1.771
Years owned
Large asset value
Loan size request
Lender asset size
Lender competition
Number of banks
Personal banking
Female owner

16.4
(13.021)
57.0%

16.4
(12.999)
56.6%

16.3
(13.463)
63.7%

102074.000

288,550
(3069009.73)
6,834,000,000
(115910000000)
40.1%

294,286
(3149475.13)
6,826,000,000
(16210000000)
39.5%

185,766
(682266.367)
6,962,000,000
(9838000000)
51.0%

96590.500

1.4
(0.721)
69.5%

1.4
(0.718)
69.3%

1.4
(0.777)
72.8%

99758.000

9.3%

8.7%

19.6%

1.714

31332.500
4.934**

0.415
13.010***

Minority owner
5.3%
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Explanatory
All firms tried>1
White firms
Minority firms
Equality
Variables
Tests
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Incorporated
63.0%
64.4%
48.3%
5.386**
Years owned

13.9
(12.823)
49.8%

14.3
(13.185)
52.1%

9.9
(7.414)
27.1%

912,711
(7272486.72)
10,780,000,000
(28900000000)
40.3%

997,629
(7626221.79)
10,490,000,000
(29150000000)
40.5%

71,885
(117129.003)
13,610,000,000
(26550000000)
37.9%

Personal banking

1.5
(0.845)
60.4%

1.6
(0.816)
58.6%

1.5
(1.104)
78.0%

Female owner

11.7%

11.1%

18.3%

Large asset value
Loan size request
Lender asset size
Lender competition
Number of banks

Minority owner
9.2%
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses.
Chi-squared test conducted for equality between group proportions.
Mann-Whitney U test conducted for equality between group means.
KS
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic where Mann-Whitney U test was not applicable.
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Differences were significant at the 1% level***, at the 5% level**, and at the 10% level*.
Table VI
Logit regression results
Dependent variable Tried>1=tried (applied to) more than one financial institution (or not) in credit search
Dependent variable Tried>2=tried (applied to) more than two financial institutions (or not) in credit search
_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Explanatory
variables

Expected
sign

All firms
Tried
>1

White firms
Tried
Tried
>1
>2

Tried
>2

Minority firms
Tried
Tried
>1
>2

_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Constant
5.575*** 6.594*** 6.612*** 6.783*** 4.125
9.713***
(54.084)
(43.416)
(64.840)
(45.326)
(2.213)
(6.856)
Incorporated

0.246*
0.013
0.206
0.055
0.763
0.198
(yes=1)
(2.832)
(0.004)
(1.788)
(0.063)
(1.976)
(0.087)
Years owned

-0.014** 0.012
0.011*
-0.009
0.041
0.052
(5.524)
(2.162)
(3.526)
(1.139)
(1.948)
(1.718)
Large asset value

0.645*** 0.603***
0.584*** 0.541**
1.151** 1.010
(yes=1)
(17.686)
(8.028)
(13.190)
(5.817)
(4.269)
(1.897)
Log loan size request +
0.330*** 0.369***
0.349*** 0.370***
0.081
0.350
(49.655)
(38.685)
(50.253)
(35.347)
(0.194)
(2.567)
Log lender asset size
±
0.048
0.031
0.038
0.012
0.106
0.208
(2.449)
(0.524)
(1.390)
(0.074)
(0.869)
(2.023)
Lender competition
+
0.085
0.393**
0.052
0.321
0.641
1.268*
(yes=1)
(0.382)
(3.943)
(0.130)
(2.386)
(1.438)
(2.809)
Number of banks
+
0.395*** 0.372***
0.388*** 0.361***
0.370
0.431
(20.011)
(11.890)
(16.125) (8.704)
(2.233)
(2.670)
Personal banking

0.320**
0.201
0.397*** 0.225
0.711
0.190
(yes=1)
(5.367)
(1.106)
(7.712)
(1.277)
(1.137)
(0.055)
Female owner
+
- 0.213
-0.579** -0.308
-0.698***
0.182
-0.272
(yes=1)
(1.117)
(5.168)
(2.060)
(6.644)
(0.090)
(0.123)
Minority owner
+
-0.616*** -0.599**
(yes=1)
(6.595)
(3.843)
Model χ2
109.708*** 70.500*** 99.086*** 59.351*** 22.005*** 14.311
Log-likelihood
1387.365 833.298
1270.733 754.827
71.183
71.083
N
1350
1350
1257
1257
93
93
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Note: Wald test statistic values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% significance levels, respectively.

106

